China and Ukraine: Xi Jinping Spins the Russian Roulette
The Russian Olympic Committee in Bird’s Nest, Beijing. /Photo by Chris Bengel
For all working classes in Asia, Europe, and the world, the war in Ukraine is the beginning of a more dangerous and turbulent period of capitalist disorder. To end this war and avoid future wars, the working class must settle scores with capitalism and imperialism.
When Xi Jinping declared at the opening ceremony of the Beijing Winter Olympics that his friendship with Putin "has no limit", he apparently did not heed Sun-Tzu’s admonition. Just 20 days later, Putin's forces invaded Ukraine.
Everyone is guessing how much Xi Jinping and the "Xi core" actually know about Putin's plans for war. Are they kept in the dark? It seems unlikely. Is Xi Jinping, like Putin, betting on a quick and landslide victory for the Russian military? Seems like a reasonable guess. Does Xi Jinping know more but did not tell other top CCP leaders? possible. In any case, both dictators grossly misjudged the situation. And such mistakes can ultimately threaten their position in power.
There is a rift within the Chinese regime that is hard to hide, and there is considerable opposition to Xi's pro-Putin line, partly reflected in Beijing's conflicting messages. As senior Chinese affairs critic Keji Nakasawa said, as the ruling organ of the Communist Party of China, there are differences within the Seventh Standing Committee of the Politburo on forming an alliance with Russia: "Seven people have different opinions." Disagreement over Ukraine's war stance, coupled with the partial rollback of economic policies promoted by Xi, is likely to intensify the power struggle within the Communist Party.
Xi Jinping wanted "total control and stability" on the eve of the 20th Party Congress and expected to be crowned a lifelong dictator like Putin, but now it is the worst time for him. The anti-Xi faction, led by Premier Li Keqiang and backed by some red capitalists* and retired officials, is still too weak to overthrow Xi, but they are becoming more vocal in their criticisms of Xi's policies. To implement policies at such a severe stage of crisis, Xi Jinping's regime must become more authoritarian and centralized, turning the instability into a vicious cycle.
'Great Disagreement'
Hu Wei, Deputy Director of the Center for Public Policy Research, wrote in an article: "China cannot be tied to Putin. It needs to be cut as soon as possible." The article was widely circulated during the Communist Party's two sessions in early March and then removed by Internet censors. The importance of the article is that it is rare to openly criticize Xi Jinping's line (without naming names, of course) and has considerable support among the top ranks of the party. Hu Wei said that the war "caused great divisions in the country" and that "supporters and opponents are incompatible". He warned: "At present, it is estimated that there is still a window of one or two weeks (to cut ties with Russia). If it is delayed, China may lose room for maneuver and must act decisively."
Hu's comments were the sharpest expression yet of China's ruling class's disagreement over Xi's "Wolf Warrior Diplomacy", and the Sino-Russian alliance is the latest and most controversial point on the issue. A considerable number of CCP officials and their capital-affiliated associates believe that Xi Jinping's nationalist line is increasingly counterproductive—destroying the economy and fueling US imperialist’s anti-China rhetoric. However, because the alliance with Russia was supervised by Xi Jinping himself, it was difficult for the CCP regime to reverse course. At best, the tone may now be revised rather than substantively changed. Hu Wei advocates "cutting" with Putin, which also means that it will seriously attack the "strongman" image that Xi Jinping has worked hard to create in the past decade. A change in tone is now more likely than a change of substance.
The extent of Beijing's difficulties also depends on how the war unfolds. If it were to be a war that lasts for months, with the Russians ramping up brutal bombing of besieged cities, it would be harder for the Chinese to maintain "false neutrality", which would be a nightmarish scenario.
A worse scenario for Xi would be Putin's fall from power whether due to a popular movement or a political coup. So, while trying to be ambiguous, the Xi regime will try to help Putin stay in power.
Xi is trying to project an image of a nationalist strongman who dares to stand up to the United States, and the Chinese regime's paradoxical "neutrality" in the Ukraine war has undermined his authority. Externally, the CCP’s rhetoric toward Biden is vague and polite, keeping its distance from Russia, while its domestic propaganda promotes nationalism and is highly pro-Russian. Some Chinese citizens have noticed the stark contrast, which undercuts Mr. Xi’s nationalist propaganda while exposing the hypocrisy of his global image as a “peacemaker.” Many groups in China, as well as overseas Chinese, have launched a "Great Translation Movement" to translate into English the brash nationalist, racist and sexist remarks on state-controlled media and social media platforms. The movement reflects some Chinese people's distaste for the CCP's propaganda.
Truman Doctrine
For Mr. Putin and Russian capitalism, the war in Ukraine could rival America's disastrous decision to invade Iraq in 2003. George W. Bush, then US President, completely underestimated the depth of the political quagmire they had plunged into. Mr. Putin misjudged everything from the strength of the Russian army to the level of resistance in Ukraine (for which he is also paying the price by attacking Lenin's ideas on ethnic issues) to the state of the world and the scale of western imperialists' responses. Xi Jinping has so blatantly aligned his regime with Putin's, that he disregards the risks of becoming a target of Western sanctions. He risks not only diplomatic isolation but an accelerated decoupling from the West at a potentially devastating economic cost.
The war in Ukraine has changed everything, explains the International Socialist Way (ISA). The Financial Times, a newspaper that advocates western capitalism, described the moment as a "geopolitical fulcrum" and urged Washington to adopt a version of the 1947 Truman Doctrine, which divided countries into pro-American and anti-American camps. In the short term, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has strengthened the hand of western capitalist governments, leading them to extraordinary arms buildup, unprecedented use of state intervention in financial markets to impose sanctions, and aggressive policies framed as defending "democracy" against "autocracy."
In recent years, the new Cold War between China and the United States has experienced a "great leap forward" after Russia invaded Ukraine. An acceleration of economic deglobalization is inevitable. Russia's invasion has allowed the EU and US-led camps to heal their divisions, at least in the short term. Shinzo Abe, Japan's former prime minister, has called for the US to deploy nuclear weapons in Japan, while Germany has emerged as the world's third-largest military spender. The war in Ukraine purged upended post-1989 world order.
'Disaster Capitalism'
Such a degree of Western solidarity is something that Chinese foreign policy has been trying to prevent since Barack Obama and Donald Trump became US presidents. Thus, Putin's war greatly facilitated Biden's strategy of building an alliance of "democratic" to contain Russia and China. Xi’s substantive support for Russian aggression makes it easier for U.S. imperialists to use the conflict against Russia as a cover for what is essentially a proxy war against China, a long-standing primary target. The nature and scale of Western sanctions against Russia are a crucial part of this proxy war.
The sharp escalation of the conflict between the West and Russia is inseparable from the conflict between China and America. Mr. Biden has been pushing for a stronger alliance with Europe, particularly using NATO, to reverse Mr. Trump's isolationist "America first" policy. The aim is to isolate China in international politics and increase pressure on China in disputes in the Indo-Pacific region such as in the South China Sea and Taiwan. In the long run, Asia is more strategically important to the US than Ukraine and Eastern Europe. All this means that the war in Ukraine is a preview of future global conflicts.
Socialists oppose Russia's invasion and Putin's imperialist designs on the one hand, and NATO and American imperialism on the other. The purgatory conditions facing the Ukrainian people are a warning sign of what humanity will face under "disaster capitalism" -- in addition to climate catastrophe and deadly epidemics, the specter of military conflict between nuclear powers also haunts the world. We look to the heroic anti-war protests in Russia and point to the need for working-class internationalism -- first of all, solidarity with the Ukrainian people, but also solidarity with the opposition to militaristic and anti-worker policies of all bourgeois governments.
All the words and deeds of the imperialist forces are hypocritical. Mr. Putin openly denies Ukraine's right to be a nation-state. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the world that China "firmly stands for respecting and safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries", but at the same time domestic media only reported on the Pro-Russian war and refused to use the word "invasion". Mr. Biden, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Scholz made their decisions, not in the interest of the Ukrainian people, but to maximize geopolitical gain in Mr. Putin's setbacks. Years of political maneuvering by the United States and NATO, using Ukraine's bourgeois right-wing government as pawns, also helped sow the seeds of war. Now NATO intends to "fight to the last gasp in Ukraine", praising Ukraine's heroic resistance while trying to keep the conflict within the region -- as evidenced in NATO’s rejection for Poland to supply warplanes.
China as a superpower
It is the most serious international crisis facing the Communist party's regime since the collapse of the Soviet Union 30 years ago and the collapse of Stalinist dictatorships in Eastern Europe. This is the first serious crisis facing China as the second superpower -- an imperialist power with a global sphere of interests, super-sized companies, and huge investments to defend – in fierce competition with the US. In 1992, China was not even among the world's top 10 economies. China was a little-known player preoccupied with domestic problems (completing the restoration of capitalism after the 1989 Tiananmen upheaval). Today, China, the world's second-largest economy, is far more integrated into the global financial and trading system than Russia, the 11th largest. The threat of Chinese capitalism being shut out of western markets by sanctions is greater than the equivalent threat to Russia.
Socialists are against sanctions. Sanctions are the most powerful financial tool of capitalism, which can then be used against workers and the struggle against socialism. In Hong Kong and Xinjiang, the ISA opposes western sanctions, warning that they will not stop the Communist Party from state repression, but will weaken and disrupt popular struggle. The sanctions against Russia are immeasurable, but we oppose them not on the basis of their intensity, but on the basis of who is imposing them and for what purpose.
Photo by Cameron Abadi
5.5% GDP growth?
Even as the Communist party's diplomatic sideshow -- paying lip service to peace but defending Putin -- tries to shield itself from Western sanctions, China stands to suffer huge economic losses. China is the world's largest oil importer, importing 70 percent of its oil and 40 percent of its natural gas. International crude prices have risen 60 percent in 2021 and another 11 percent since Russian troops entered Ukraine. The end result will be more coal use and even worse climate damage.
China's agriculture minister warned in March that this year's wheat harvest "could be the worst on record" because of heavy rains last year. China will need to increase wheat imports by about 50 percent, as prices have surged by 50 percent to record highs since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Russia and Ukraine export a quarter of the world's wheat, but sanctions and war have disrupted world markets. Soaring global food prices threaten mass hunger and "bread riots" in many developing countries.
But it is the threat of secondary sanctions -- of China being drawn into a US-led web of sanctions mainly aimed at Russia -- that could hit the Chinese economy hard as growth slows sharply. At the National People's Congress on March 5, the Chinese government announced a GDP growth target of 5.5 percent for 2022, the lowest target in nearly 30 years. Most economists doubt this will be achieved. The figure looks more like a "confidence boost" than a realistic target -- the International Monetary Fund and others are forecasting 4.8 percent growth this year for China -- but anything less than 5 percent would be tantamount to CCP throwing in the towel and backfiring on the government.
Even without the dangerous economic consequences of the war in Ukraine, The Chinese economy faces serious problems: a slow collapse of the real estate sector, rising unemployment, sluggish consumption, and supply chain disruptions caused by lockdowns imposed to prevent the spread of the Omicron strain of the virus. The Xi Jinping regime insists on continuing its "Dynamic Zero-Covid" policy, but this policy has suffered a complete failure in Hong Kong - there are currently more than 1 million confirmed cases in Hong Kong, and the death rate has become the highest in the world. Morgan Stanley predicts that China's economy will see zero growth in the first quarter due to the impact of the Omicron variant virus. Despite a U-turn in government policy that aims to ease credit controls and monetary policy, even abandoning Xi Jinping’s proposed real estate tax, China’s real estate market – the main driver of economic growth – has contracted for six months in both prices and sales.
The CCP did not anticipate Putin’s war and did not prepare for it. At such a critical turning point in the Sino-US Cold War, the Xi Jinping regime was completely at a loss, exposing the fragility and internal contradictions of its regime. The first wave of COVID-19 in Wuhan, the protest in Hong Kong in 2019, and the trade war in 2018—Xi Jinping has repeatedly fallen short and made mistakes! Now, Xi Jinping even described the joint statement issued by China and Russia on February 4, which announced an “unlimited” strategic partnership between the two countries, a “winner alliance”. His statements have since backfired. It was Xi Jinping, not Putin, who proposed the new alliance. Xi Jinping mainly wants to increase his own authority during the Beijing Winter Olympics, which are largely boycotted by world leaders (Only 21 world leaders were present this year, compared to 68 in 2008). For Xi Jinping, whose energies are focused on being re-elected at the 20th Party Congress, the Olympics are little more than the electoral rallies in bourgeois democracy — nothing but fireworks and patriotism.
"Like two brothers"
It is worth noting that the top leaders of the two countries compare their strategic partnership to 'back-to-back'—meaning that the two countries are like two brothers, protecting each other's rear..." The CCP's Global Times (February 13 in the English version) as commented. This description may not stand the test of history. Now Chinese diplomats are constantly trying to avoid being viewed as an “accomplice” of Putin to avoid sanctions. Since the Feb. 4 statement, the two sides have not made much real progress — just expanding or repackaging existing energy and technology cooperation. Its purpose is simply to signal a common front against the United States. But now that Putin has provoked the biggest war in Europe in 80 years, Xi Jinping is seriously miscalculating.
Xi Jinping is betting that his regime can take advantage of military tensions in Europe by forcing the Biden administration to shift its focus away from the Indo-Pacific and China. Like Putin, Xi Jinping may have mistakenly assumed that divisions between U.S. and European imperialists (especially Germany) would widen. Furthermore, the current situation shows that the two dictators are not "brothers" and that the alliance between the two sides is really just a matter of strategy. Xi Jinping sees Russia as increasingly reliant on China and sees China as its "big brother," in contrast to the Cold War in the 1950s when both countries were Stalinist dictatorships and the Soviet Union was China's "big brother." If Putin's aggressive diplomacy and threats against Ukraine are successful, and Western capitalism has only superficial protests (as it did with Xi Jinping's crackdown on Hong Kong), this could strengthen Xi Jinping's calculations about Taiwan.
Therefore, whether or not Xi Jinping is fully aware of the plan to invade Ukraine in advance, he would relish the situation that Putin is causing trouble for the West and China is watching from the side. On February 24, though, all those positives turned into negatives.
Xi Jinping may become the leader of China who has "lost Europe". Using trade diplomacy and touting European "sovereignty" to try to disrupt the EU (especially Germany, which is very dependent on China's economy) and Biden’s anti-China policy has always been an important feature of China's diplomacy. This route took a heavy hit last year (the failed China-EU trade deal, Xinjiang sanctions, Merkel's retirement, the "Lithuania incident"), but the war in Ukraine and China's relationship with Putin may be the final nail in the coffin. U.S. imperialism will of course also consciously counteract, and they will be more successful in the shadow of the Ukraine war.
The division between imperialists
Mr. Biden's phone call with Mr. Xi on March 18 was also aimed in part at Europe -- and the two leaders' speeches were deliberately aimed at Brussels and, in particular, Berlin. Biden warned of "serious consequences" if China provided Military aid to Russia, or helped it circumvent Western sanctions, as it claims to have. The US is in effect drawing a "red line" for China and putting pressure on Europe to support this position. The crippling impact of Russian sanctions makes this threat very real for Beijing.
The European Union is already divided over whether to tighten sanctions against Russia. An EU diplomat told The Times that there were now three camps. The first is the so-called hardline “sanctions”, including Poland and the three Baltic states, who are geographically closest to the war zone and thus most affected by the military escalation. They argue for tougher sanctions, such as a complete ban on Russian energy imports. On the other side is the "opposition", led by Germany and supported by Italy, Hungary, Greece, and Bulgaria, which all oppose tighter sanctions. Then there are the rest.
This internal division in the EU is similar when it comes to China. Hungary is pro-China, and Germany is traditionally close to China. In 2021 China accounted for 38% of the German car sales. On the other hand, the David-and-goliath-like conflict between China and Lithuanian turned
into a bigger EU trade crisis. The war in Ukraine has dealt a blow to Xi's signature policy, one Belt, One Road. The damage, like sanctions and other effects of war, may be permanent, lasting long after the war is over. Ukraine is an important strategic partner of the Belt and Road initiative, as is Russia. Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia are among the BELT and Road participants supporting Ukraine, while Belarus, another member, supports Russia. How ironic now that the CCP is trying to build "peace and cooperation" with the BELT and Road initiative!
The current developments will force Beijing to undertake a major reassessment of the whole BRI. The Belt and Road initiative has run into major problems, unfinished projects, and disputes due to the growing debt crisis in many participating countries. In Eastern Europe, billions of dollars worth of Chinese investment projects are now in jeopardy because of Putin's wars, including nearly $3 billion in Chinese construction projects in Ukraine alone. China's "17+1" Cooperation with Central and Eastern European Countries, a Chinese investment forum that overlaps the BELT and Road initiative, may also fall apart. Lithuania pulled out of the deal last year, and western powers that dominate the EU have long viewed the 17+1 bloc as an encroachment by China into the EU's "backyard". This stance could prompt a more forceful response from the Western to China and force smaller countries that become pawns to withdraw from the 17+1.
Taiwan and Ukraine
The Ukrainian conflict also has implications for Taiwan's future, but not the relationship Xi Jinping initially envisioned. China's foreign ministry has always insisted that "Taiwan is not Ukraine", focusing on issues of legitimacy and "sovereignty", which Putin has proved to be no deterrent to incursion by avaricious capitalist regimes. The Communist Party says Taiwan is not a "state", but it is at odds with Putin over whether Ukraine's sovereignty should be respected.
For socialists, our position is based on more fundamental considerations: national consciousness (shared by Ukrainians and Taiwanese), democratic expectations, fears of authoritarian rule, and military invasion. Under capitalism and imperialism, the masses of both Taiwan and Ukraine were tragically caught between larger powers that had no intention of achieving real peace or democracy.
Xi may think that the Ukraine conflict will prompt the United States to divert military resources to Europe and increase pressure on Japan through an alliance between China and Russia, thereby strengthening Xi's control over the Taiwan Strait. Perhaps he hoped that Russia's quick and overwhelming victory would expose the West as a paper tiger. None of this happened, but the opposite happened. Xi Jinping's strategy to "unify" Taiwan appears to be more problematic than before. This does not mean, however, that war or Chinese invasion will not break out in the long run. as some mistakenly believe. The small group of Taiwanese who left the ISA last year saw China's military threats as "bluster" – based on the naive conclusion that they no longer needed to associate the struggle for independence with socialism and a common struggle with Chinese workers.
The brutal progress of Putin's invasion so far, and the heavy (unconfirmed) losses suffered by Russia, should serve as a wake-up call to hardliners in the PLA. The Russian army has far more combat experience than the Chinese army. It is easier to invade Ukraine by land than to land on Taiwan. Military experts estimate that an attack on Taiwan would be at least as difficult as the Normandy landing in 1944. But Mr. Putin is also confident. So if the war in Ukraine has any effect on China, it will make the Chinese military question its strategy and undergo a major reassessment.
If Putin's plan is to occupy Ukraine (that goal looks increasingly unrealistic today), the United States and NATO will surely respond by funding right-wing Rebels in Ukraine. This may succeed in weakening Moscow's resolve, but it takes years and many lives, and it also tends to hinder and undermine the genuine popular struggle. The situation is also troubling for the Party's hawks in Taiwan. Even assuming that the PLA could successfully invade Taiwan and rule an island of 23m people, the vast majority of whom do not want to be ruled by Beijing. This would over time lead to the exhaustion and disintegration of the Chinese occupying forces.
Rising nationalism
Rising nationalist sentiment on both sides of the strait has made the situation more volatile. he rising popularity of Taiwan's Tsai Ing-wen and DPP’s pro-U.S. policies combined with Putin’s recent invasions may prompt Xi Jinping to attack Taiwan.
A March poll by the International Institute for Strategic Studies found 70.2 percent of Taiwanese were "willing to fight to defend Taiwan", compared with 40.3 percent in December. Like other governments, the DPP is using the crisis to create "national unity" to curb class warfare and to push for more pro-capital trade agreements with America and Japan in return for their "protection." Ms. Tsai is also pushing for more military spending and an extension of compulsory military service.
In China, the online "Wolf Warrior" nationalism that the Communist Party has been preaching for years is now interwoven with worship of Putin and support for Russia but now risks spiraling out of control. "Little pink" and other social media nationalists (some with ideas close to fascism) have become so rampant self-confident. Their evil speech not only for gay men and women activists, the "Taiwan independence," and the people of Hong Kong but also extended to past CCP mouthpieces, for example, the former editor-in-chief Hu Xijin. For Beijing, these nationalist pressures are becoming harder to contain, leaving the party with less room for maneuver and a more "pragmatic" foreign policy.
For working classes in Asia, Europe, and the world, the war in Ukraine was the beginning of a more dangerous and turbulent period of capitalist disorder. To end this war and avoid future wars, the working class must settle scores with capitalism and imperialism. Organizing and protesting against the war is a good start, but it is not enough. In these circumstances, much more is needed than pressure or calls for change in government policy. The working class also had to overcome its disorganization, its lack of voice, and its lack of power. It is now more urgent than ever to rebuild a strong socialist workers' movement and fight against capitalism and militarism.
“Red capitalists” are wealthy individuals within the Chinese Communist Party. They have gathered their wealth from economic developments starting in the 1970s while holding considerable political power in China.
This piece is translated by Aowen Guan and Harry Huang